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ABSTRACT: The role of ‘popular cultures’ and symbolic aspects such as narratives, imaginaries, audio and 
visual products in the emergence, success, and development of populism is poorly explored in literature. 
This article aims at investigating the relationship between populism and popular cultures by analyzing the 
case of the Spanish party Podemos. From the beginning, for the founding nucleus of Podemos it was crucial 
to try to be hegemonic, to match common sense, popular attitudes and identities, and to go beyond the 
traditional boundaries inside which the alternative left was enclosed. The article focuses on the relationship 
between the political evolution of the party and its use of music as a political tool and a ground for cultural 
debate. The link emerges between these political uses of music and the trajectory of the party, where the 
latter influences the former. Moreover, by debating on the political role of music, Podemos leaders delved 
deeper into he wider issue of the relationship between political hegemony and popular cultures, and 
discussed it. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The role of popular cultures and symbolic aspects such as narratives, imaginaries, 
audio and visual products in the emergence and development of populism is poorly 
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explored in literature (Caiani and Padoan, this volume). The scarce presence of these 
elements in populist studies is quite paradoxical, given the acknowledged importance 
that emotions and symbolic constructions have in populist phenomena. Popular cultures 
and cultural objects that transmit, spread, and shape them may play an important role 
in defining populist discourses (Ostiguy 2018). Populisms and populist leaders aim at 
establishing emotional connections with their People and at representing their 
authenticity. They pursue these goals also by appropriating and mobilizing popular 
cultures linked to forms of folklore, tastes, aesthetics, and cultural productions. From 
this point of view, between populism and “pop” (pop cultures and pop products) there 
is a sort of natural correlation. Moreover, emotions may produce cognitive effects that 
contribute to shaping symbolic constructions and the populist use of cultural products, 
which precisely aims to link emotions, symbolic constructs and narratives (Máiz 2011, 
Ben-Ze’ev 2000). Amongst cultural products, the function of music in these processes 
and its use by populist actors has been underestimated so far, although these actors 
often resort to music as a tool to create shared identities and shape the narratives 
sustaining them (Duncombe and Bleiker 2015).  
This article aims at exploring the relationship between populism and popular cultures, 
by analysing the case of the Spanish party Podemos. The empirical focus is placed on the 
relationship between the political evolution of the party and its use of music as a political 
tool and a ground for cultural debate. As it will be displayed, by debating on the political 
role of music, Podemos leaders deepened the wider issue of the relationship between 
hegemony and popular cultures. Secondly, the link between this political use of music 
and the trajectory of the party, i.e. the ways in which the latter influences the former, 
will be observed by analysing the evolution of how Podemos has used music in campaign 
events and public meetings. Until 2016, this party usually referred to itself as a populist 
force (Lobera 2015, Gómez and Ramiro 2017), and its relationship with populism has 
always been an issue explicitly and publically discussed by its leaders (as well as an 
internal terrain of confrontation). As it will be observed, 2016 constituted a turning point 
in the evolution of the party also with respect to this issue. That turning point was 
reflected on the Podemos internal debate on music and popular culture.  
The key issue that the article explores is precisely the constitutive link existing 
between the party’s approach to populism and its internal debate on popular culture. By 
virtue of the foundational role that the debate on populism and popular culture had in 
the very origins of the party (and in the decision to found it), the constitutive elements 
and features of Podemos will be itemized and related to its internal debate on music, 
pop culture and hegemony.  
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The case study is therefore linked to the theoretical issue of how a populist party tries 
to use symbols and cultural products to convey identity and emotions. The investigation 
concerns the very construction of ‘the popular’ by a populist force aiming at reaching a 
mass consensus. When a party such as Podemos (similarly to all populist parties) tries to 
set aside the traditional communication codes of political action to reach large audiences 
- in its case abandoning the liturgies, the language and symbols of the traditional left -, 
what tries to replace them with? Is this replacement successful? To what extent can a 
party aiming at building ‘the popular’ from the left draw on forms of folklore and popular 
culture autonomously elaborated by ‘the people’? To what extent, on the contrary, does 
the construction of the popular depend on mainstream products and the cultural 
industry, historically a counterpart for left-wing parties? The relationship between 
Podemos and musical products is from this point of view emblematic. As a matter of fact, 
music was one of the elected grounds on which the party tried to build its own innovative 
symbolism and to elaborate new forms of identification with its base. Right here it had 
to to suffer a setback in its action. Searching for a popular culture outiside the market, 
Podemos mostly found a vacuum. The party has not found its own "music" (and, more 
in general, its own ‘popular culture’), and its leaders came to the conclusion that a 
political party (especially left-wing), in highly plural and complex societies, can neither 
have nor communicate only one culture. They finally argued the party can at best be a 
platform assembling heterogeneous products, styles and messages developed by other 
social actors, such as social movements, artists or the media. In its internal debates on 
these issues, Podemos split between the defense of alternative and militant cultures and 
the use of mainstream cultural products. The party did not succeed in finding sufficient 
cultural resources in the middle of these two polarities, which could serve as a bridge 
between an autonomous cultural elaboration and mass consensus. Over time, the choice 
was to go back to symbols and themes more specific of the traditional left, also following 
a sort of repentance by its leaders for a use of ‘pop’ products and means they finally 
considered excessively subject to the market.  
The article is structured as follows. In the second section the foundational elements 
of Podemos that later influenced its debate on culture and music will be summarized. 
The third section outlines a brief history of the party’s trajectory and discusses the 
evolution of the party’s use of music in public meetings, the internal discussion about it 
and th use of musical metaphors as a means to face internal disputes.  
Regarding the use of music in political events by Podemos, the full videos (thirty vid-
eos overall) of the main party rallies and electoral events in the 2014, 2015, 2016 and 
2019 European and national elections were viewed. The selected events are the ones in 
which the main national leaders of the party participated, thus the first and the last event 
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of each campaign, and the ones organized in the major cities of the Country during the 
last week of campaign. As for the internal debate on the use of music and cultural prod-
ucts, the public conferences and seminars the party devoted to this theme were viewed, 
and the interventions in the newspapers by its leaders linked to this debate were con-
sulted. 
 
 
2. Populism, common sense and hegemony: the sources of Podemos 
Scholars, observers, and the media have defined Podemos in different ways so far. A 
movement party emerging from the Indignados (Martín 2015, Subirtas 2015, della Porta 
et al. 2017); neo-Leninist party (Torreblanca 2015); a party whose success is due to an 
intensive and innovative use of social media; television-party, in which the leader’s 
media notoriety is an element that globally structures it (Giménez 2014a). Despite this 
variety of definitions, Podemos has been almost unanimously considered a populist 
party, whose rhetoric is centered on the contrast between pure people and a corrupt 
elite, which Podemos articulates in dichotomies such as common people/privileged, 
producers/parasites, social majority/elites, virtue/corruption, democracy/oligarchy, 
above/below (Del Rio 2015, Font, Graziano and Tsakatika 2015, Gómez-Reino and 
Llamazares I. 2015). In the context of existing varieties of populisms, Podemos is usually 
considered a form of inclusionary populism (Caiani and Graziano 2019, Gómez and 
Ramiro 2017, Graziano 2018).  
The decision to constitute Podemos by its founding nucleus was based on four essen-
tial elements: the academic context from which all the founders came from; their crea-
tion of a web-TV and their approach to mass media; their interpretation of Indignados 
movements as hegemonic movements reshaping political cultures; their use of political 
theory and, particularly, of Laclau’s theory on populism. Since the beginning, all these 
four elements have established a crucial link between the foundation of the party and 
its founders’ theoretical research on populism, common sense, hegemony, popular cul-
tures and mass media. Moreover, these four elements strongly resurfaced in a decisive 
period of the party’s trajectory, the phase of internal confrontation between its two 
main political areas, during which the debate on music took place within the party.  
 
2.1. Popularizing intellectual work 
The founding nucleus of Podemos consisted of professors and researchers from the 
Faculty of Political Sciences and Sociology of the Complutense University of Madrid, who 
came from the radical left end of the spectrum (Torreblanca 2015, Gimenez 2014). This 
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nucleus came from two political groups: Contrapoder and La Promotora. The Student 
Association Contrapoder was founded in the Faculty in 2006, and it was involved in the 
mobilization process against education reforms between 2007 and 2010. In the same 
years and in the same faculty, Iglesias and other professors constituted La Promotora de 
Pensamiento Crítico, a political group formed by scholars who organized courses and 
debates, and published books and articles (Giménez 2014b). The dissatisfaction of these 
two groups with the usual forms of academic debate and with the limited boundaries 
within which the left was able to spread its proposals and analyses, was at the origin of 
stylistic and communicative innovations. In 2009, Iglesias promoted academic debates 
and seminars based on television formats. The objective was to be at the same time 
“majoritarian and disruptive,” bringing a message of social transformation as far as pos-
sible beyond the traditional circuit of the militant left (Avinazada 2015, Bescansa 2015, 
Toret Medina 2015). It was a form of intellectual production intrinsically mediatized, ex-
ternally oriented and popularized, although it remained faithful, linguistically and the-
matically, to the canons of the alternative left, at least initially. In 2009, Iglesias began to 
organize academic seminars at the Complutense in the format of a public TV talk show, 
99 segundos.  
Thanks to these initiatives by La Promotora, a decisive turning point was determined. 
The Promotora-Contrapoder network got the opportunity to act directly on the media. 
Tele K, a neighborhood television in Madrid, proposed Iglesias to create the tertulias 
televisivas (talk shows) inspired by 99 segundos on its channel. Iglesias’s political-aca-
demic seminars then moved to television, and from 2010 he became the host of a small 
weekly political talk show, La Tuerka. The progressive technical improvement of the pro-
duction favored a viewership increase of the talk show on what, since the beginning, had 
been thought as its true means of diffusion, Youtube (Giménez 2014a). The growing 
spreading of the show on social media made it possible to transfer La Tuerka to larger 
and more structured broadcasters, firstly to Canal 33 and finally, in 2013, to the web-TV 
of the national on-line newspaper Público, where it is still located. At the same time, the 
Iran-based broadcaster Hispan TV proposed Iglesias to conduct another weekly talk 
show, Fort Apache. Iglesias did not give up this job after the birth of Podemos, and he is 
still the presenter of the shows Otra vuelta de Tuerka and Fort Apache. Therefore, the 
general secretary of a political party conducts a television show twice a week, and this is 
a novelty. 
 This means that the founding nucleus of Podemos consists of a group of professional 
intellectuals and militants that primarily based its activities on the specific relationship 
that it established between theoretical reflection, militancy, and the search for commu-
nicative innovation in political endeavors. Going beyond traditional forms of 
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communication by left-wing forces and trying to match a wider audience was their main 
goal. To pursue it, they adopted “pop” formats such as TV ones.  
 
2.2. Podemos and the party-television: media as the elected ground for ideological 
dispute 
 
What is the value of La Tuerka in the history of Podemos? In the first place, La 
Tuerka was thought as a party from the beginning: 
 
Since the beginning, we have considered La Tuerka “a party.” People do not engage 
anymore politically through parties, we thought, but through the media. La Tuerka and our 
second program, Fort Apache, were the “parties” through which we would launch our 
political battle on the most fundamental terrain of ideological production: television 
(Iglesias 2015, p. 21). 
 
Anyone who wants to do politics must have tools for ideological production. We do 
not care and it is not enough to have ‘alternative media,’ as the left has traditionally 
thought. We want to compete as equals, to be a tool for the ideological and political 
battle, which competes with the big ones in defining reality.1 
Before the prospect of a new party arose, La Tuerka was conceived as an instrument 
to use on the terrain of ideological confrontation which, according to Iglesias, is essen-
tially played in the field of media and, particularly, television (Iglesias 2014b). A left that 
does not want to condemn itself to marginality must be popular, and in order to be pop-
ular it must intervene effectively on television (Iglesias 2014a). The early Podemos pro-
duced a general re-evaluation of the role of mass culture, very discontinuous with the 
tradition of the critical and the alternative left: 
 
Radical politics, which aspires to generate a new hegemony and a new power block, is not 
the one positioning itself against the forms of consensus of its age, in a melancholic margin 
of frontal opposition, but the one taking charge of the culture of its time (Errejón 2015). 
 
This does not mean that the initial nucleus of Podemos did not strongly criticize mass 
media. Before Podemos, Iglesias was extremely critical towards the media, especially the 
private ones. What Podemos re-evaluated is the relationship between people and mass 
media, i.e. between what is popular and communication, arguing that the left should 
 
1 Interview to Pablo Iglesias, “Galiza ano cero” (galizaanocero.tv), June 2013. Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=33j1QlP3pbY. 
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abandon its historical attitude to ignore or stigmatize this relationship, which is instead 
a fact from which any force who wants to hold a significant political role must begin its 
action (Iglesias 2015). It can therefore be argued that if it is true that Podemos is a party 
born form a web television, the nature and objectives of this web television were origi-
nally political, if not immediately electoral. 
Through La Tuerka, future Podemos leaders searched for a connection with the way 
common sense and popular attitudes were concretely constituted in public opinion ra-
ther than aspiring to communicate with a common sense purified of its relationship with 
mass culture and the media representations of reality, like the traditional left, according 
to Iglesias, used to do. 
Television—both La Tuerka and Iglesias’s later presence from 2013 in prime time 
shows on progressive national channels such as La Sexta and Quatro—was the funda-
mental precondition for the creation of the party (Avinazada 2015, Bescansa 2015, 
Sampedro 2015, Toret Medina 2015). If Iglesias had not become notorious nationwide 
thanks to his participation in prime time talk shows, Podemos would not have been born. 
 
2.3. Podemos as the Indignados’s party? Social movements and common sense 
 
There is a strong connection between Spanish social movements and the success of 
La Tuerka. The opportunity for Iglesias to reach the big media was mainly due to the 
emergence in Spain of large social movements with a strong consensus in public opinion. 
La Tuerka became a reference for these movements and began to be considered “the 
TV of the Indignados.” National media could not avoid dealing with social demands pur-
sued by large-scale mobilizations capable of reaching a majoritarian consensus, as 80% 
of Spaniards declared to agree with the demands of the 15-M  movement (Pastor 2013). 
The fact that those movements already had a sort of media representation it was deci-
sive for Iglesias to be invited as a commentator on national TV channels (Calvo and Álva-
rez 2015). 
Podemos was thought as a political expression of social movements from the begin-
ning (Iglesias 2015, Errejón 2015). On May 15, 2011, according to the founders of Po-
demos, a new political cycle began and its main feature was to be culturally and politi-
cally transversal, an element that shaped its ability to get a majoritarian consensus. 
Once again, in Podemos’s initial discourse common sense was considered the central 
terrain of political disputes and of possible political changes (Franzé 2018). In the 15-M 
movement and the early Podemos there was no reference, as in Izquierda Unida's Marx-
ist and anti-capitalist left, to class analysis and to the language characterizing it (Antentas 
2015, Aslanidis 2015, Roberts 2016). The class cleavage—workers/entrepreneurs—did 
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not mark their symbolic elaboration (Calvo 2013, Pastor 2013). The 15-M was far away 
from the traditional left also due to its refusal to place itself along the right/left axis 
(Castañeda 2012). The largest part of the movement did not ascribe its self-definition to 
this dichotomy, but to the low/high and citizens/elites polarizations (Perugorría and 
Tejerina 2013, Hughes 2011, Cox and Fominaya 2013). 
Podemos took all these elements from the 15-M movement. The founders of the new 
party considered the 15-M a politically, generationally and socially transversal move-
ment, a plural reality impossible to force into traditional categories and able to obtain 
consensus and to change common sense by virtue of this transversal nature, signaling 
and expressing demands not by specific social actors, but by very broad “mayorías so-
ciales” (Errejón 2015). Consequently, the early Podemos aimed to go beyond the sym-
bols and identities of the traditional Left, by elaborating a new narration and addressing, 
like the 15-M, a heterogeneous majority, redefining the use of political symbols in a 
(Gramscian) national-popular sense (Iglesias 2015). These attitudes of the leadership 
group of Podemos decisively structured its political discourse until the 2016 general elec-
tions (Iglesias 2014a and 2014b, Errejón 2014a and 2014b, Del Río 2015), and they have 
been at the core of its internal debates on music and popular cultures. 
 
2.4. Podemos and political theory: Laclau’s hypothesis as a strategic base 
 
Behind all these considerations, there was not only the 15-M movement, but also a 
precise theoretical background. A further constitutive element of Podemos is Laclau’s 
theory on populism. It could be said that the party’s strategy was largely organized 
around a single book, The Populist Reason (Laclau 2008). 
According to Laclau, populism is a necessary element of every constitutive process of 
the Political: populism is politics. There are no social groups already established in the 
economic dimension independently of a process of political construction. The units of 
analysis are neither social groups nor social classes, but more limited elements that 
Laclau defined social demands. If social demands remain unaddressed, they can be ar-
ticulated in an equivalence relation: the requests become complaints, and they give 
shape to a border that constitutes the equivalential chain of unmet demands. Populism 
is precisely, Laclau argued, the political process that transforms demands into com-
plaints, building between them a chain of equivalences capable of erecting an antago-
nistic frontier between complaints and authority. Demands articulated according to mu-
tual equivalences constitute a wider social subjectivity, popular identity. According to 
Laclau, populism is therefore a clearly performative phenomenon: ‘the people’ as an ac-
tor do not emerge from the discovery of an abstract characteristic underlying all the 
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demands that make up the chain of equivalences, but from the construction of this chain 
through a specific act, the act of naming the We, the Them, and the frontier separating 
them (Cano 2015, Raniolo and Tarditi 2019).  
Given the performative nature of populism, discourse and communication—this was 
the interpretation of Laclau by Podemos’s founders (Errejón 2015)—is the main terrain 
on which the construction of the people takes shape. An effective political discourse 
must therefore at the same time match and build common sense, through a double 
movement that simultaneously allows representing existing popular identities and build-
ing a new hegemony. By the early Podemos political struggle was mainly conceived as a 
struggle over words, the meanings and signifiers of political dispute, and it should be 
acted primarily on the ground of media. Discourse was considered a performative tool, 
capable of building collective subjects that are not mere and mechanic products of his-
tory, but that are constructed as social actors by an effective linguistic performance, 
which gives shape to a disorganized matter articulating it in a new collective will (Errejón 
2014a).  
This analytical framework had strong consequences on the way  the party aimed to 
represent how  the collective actor was articulated, and therefore on the general identity 
of the party. How were “We” and “Them,” “the people” and their adversaries config-
ured? If politics is the construction of a discourse in which a wide spectrum of requests 
can be recognized, and these requests must not be limited to the simple empirical claims 
of specific social sectors, the discourse must build the broadest “people” possible (Mey-
enberg 2017). To be broad, these people must not have an antagonistic nature. They 
must stand on the side of common sense, legitimacy and law, making their opponents 
symbolically slip into minority and illegitimacy. Therefore, the “We” must be generic, 
open and adaptable to the actors and the demands it manages to include. The “Them” 
must be circumscribed instead: “They” are the “tiny minority that has set itself above 
the law.”  
In the context of this theoretical and strategic background, a populist rhetoric—the 
division of society in the two antagonistic groups of the pure people and the corrupt elite 
and the initial declaration of extraneousness to the right/left dichotomy (Graziano 2018, 
Kriesi 2014 and 2015, Gómez-Reino and Llamazares I. 2015) —was used as a sort of 
«communicative technology»  able to address wider segments of the population than 
those reached by the traditional radical left, and to build a hegemonic discourse by 
matching common sense and popular cultures.  
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3. The “popular”, commons sense and pop cultures: music and culture in Po-
demos’s trajectory 
 
3.1.  The three phases of the party 
 
The ones discussed hitherto are the sources and the founding features of the early 
Podemos: they structured the party until the end of 2015, when Podemos faced its ut-
most tasks, namely, the general elections, the entrance in Parliament, and the negotia-
tions with the socialist party (PSOE) for the formation of the government. Between 
March and April 2016, during the negotiations (later failed) for the formation of a new 
government with PSOE, Podemos went through an important internal crisis. Ten mem-
bers of the party in the Madrid region resigned due to disagreement with their re-
gional leader . All the outgoing people were very close to the political secretary of the 
party, Iñigo Errejón. The conflict was a sublimation of the rising divergence between Ig-
lesias and Errejón at the national level. What were the objects of this divergence? They 
were three: a) divergences on the attitude to hold towards the PSOE; with Errejón open 
to dialogue and Iglesias on a confrontational position; b) differences on the form to give 
to the reorganization of the party and the internal weight of the respective components, 
with a hypothetical “assault” by Errejón on the internal balances to influence the direc-
tion of this reorganization, manifested by the resignation of the Madrilenian members 
closer to him; c) the dispute about preserving the politically and culturally transversal 
nature of the early Podemos (as the Errejonstas claimed) or more explicitly assuming a 
left-wing identity.  
Thus the central issue of this conflict was the very identity of the party. Since 2016, 
Errejón insisted on the need to maintain the transversal profile—beyond left and right—
that Podemos had from the beginning. He was also in favor of voting for a government 
formed by PSOE and Ciudadanos, without the presence of Podemos, while Iglesias ex-
cluded this option. Iglesias began working on an alliance with Izquierda Unida that could 
shift the ideological axis of the party more clearly to the left. In the beginning, Errejón’s 
commitment was to declare himself against this alliance. Then, he tried to confine it to 
a dimension of pure “electoral instrumentality,” denying it a general political value. 
Errejón consistently reiterated that the alliance should not affect Podemos’s transversal 
self-representation (Franzé 2018). Therefore, in that phase the prospectively decisive 
conflict between the two components of the party (the “Pablistas” supporting Iglesias 
and the “Errejonistas,” as they used to define each other) emerged. It is possible to de-
fine this period, between the end of 2015 and the second national convention of the 
party in 2017, as the transition phase of the party. 
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This dispute remained contained until the repetition of the general elections in June 
2016, and gradually exploded after that date. The conflict led to an explicit opposition 
between the two areas at the party convention in 2017 (which was won by Iglesias with 
the 56% of internal consent, while the Errejonist area achieved the 30%), and finally to 
the definitive exit from the party by the Errejonists in 2019. In 2019, Errejón participated 
in the regional elections in Madrid with his own political platform. Since September 
2019, this platform has become a national autonomous party, competing in the general 
elections in November 2019.  
After the national convention in 2017 during which the two internal areas confronted, 
the transition phase of the party ended and Podemos began assuming a more defined 
left-wing profile.2 Populist rhetoric was significantly set aside. The party system—for-
merly called “the Caste” by Podemos—ended up being the main argumentative object 
of the party discourse, which moved from the terrain of anti-political establishment rhet-
oric to the centrality of social issues and to criticism towards the economic establish-
ment. The party began defining itself “the left” and being significantly institutionalized. 
Due to these reasons, the post-2017 phase can be considered as the post-populist phase 
of Podemos. 
The emerging conflict between “Pablistas” and “Errejonistas” in 2016 is the context 
within which the internal confrontation on (and through) music and popular cultures 
took place. It was indeed after the elections in June 2016, when the divergence between 
the two areas began to emerge, that the use of musical metaphors became an instru-
ment of internal political controversy, and the political differences were translated in 
and staged as cultural differences. However, the other side of the internal debate on 
music, the one regarding the political use of music by the party, had begun previously. 
 
 
3.2. Popular culture and hegemony: music as a political metaphor 
 
Three forms of political use of music have been explored so far. Firstly, music with 
explicit political contents can be used as a form of protest by social movements and 
 
2 It is also sensible to remind that Spanish citizens did never believe the tale of the transversal nature of 
Podemos. All surveys in 2015 and 2016 showed that citizens used to place Podemos on the extreme left, 
even more on the left than Izquierda Unida. Moreover, the share of Podemos votes coming from the right 
was derisory, while the party collected almost the totality of its votes from former voters of PSOE and 
Izquierda Unida, former abstaining voters, and new voters (Fernandez 2016). Therefore, the attempt to 
transmit a transversal profile was, in that period, effective to attract left-wing electors more than to collect 
a transversal consent.  
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contentious forms of collective action (Danaher 2019). Secondly, music can be employed 
to insert deviant or radical cultures into mainstream paradigms and de-marginalize 
them. Thirdly, political actors can appropriate non-political (and mainstream) songs 
adapting them to political functions as a form of “resistance to power” in authoritarian 
or traditional-mainstream regimes.  
In this section, two further spheres of relationship between music (and popular cul-
ture) and politics will be explored. The first one involves the ways in which, within a 
party, music and culture become a disputed terrain in internal political dynamics and 
conflicts. How party leaders internally discuss their use of music and cultural products? 
In which ways the political use of cultural products may become an internal contentious 
and disputed issue? How the relationship between pop culture and politics is related 
with the populist nature of a party? 
In 2016, after Podemos’s second participation to general elections, music became a 
terrain—and an instrument—of internal debate. Internal political differences among 
‘Errejonistas’ and ‘Pablistas’ were translated into musical (and, more broadly, cultural) 
terms. Pablo Iglesias launched this sort of translation in a public meeting of the party in 
Vigo, in September 2016, where he said: 
 
“Podemos must stick to a different language a language that allows to politicize pain. Caus-
ing fear in the powerful is a virtue. Podemos needs more Bruce Springsteen and less 
Coldplay.”3  
 
This metaphorical dichotomy was re-launched by El Nega, the front man of Los Chickos 
del Maíz, a militant hip-hop band that has been a musical landmark for Pablo Iglesias 
since several years. El Nega (Ricardo Romero) is a friend of Iglesias’s and an activist in 
Podemos, were he supports Iglesias’s stances.4 Los Chikos del Maíz are very popular in 
Spain, particularly among young people, although they are excluded from mainstream 
media circuits and their songs contain radical political messages.  
In September 2016, two months after the general elections in which Podemos did not 
succeed in getting more votes than the Socialist Party and guiding a left-wing cabinet, El 
Nega wrote a tweet launching the debate about music and populism: 
 
 
3 Available at: https://www.eldiario.es/galicia/Pablo-Iglesias-Podemos-Bruce-Spring-
steen_0_560994872.html 
4 He also took part several times in the early shows on La Tuerka, in the context of the column “La Tuerka 
rap”.  
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There are two Podemos (there have always been) one that wants to be kind as Coldplay 
and another that wants to be like Bruce Springteen. Let's be like the #Boss5 
 
This metaphorical dichotomy became the umbrella under which the internal debate 
between two different cultural approaches (and approaches to culture) was then devel-
oped: Springsteen (rock, genuineness, authenticity, combativeness) vs. Coldplay (main-
stream, pop music, conformism, moderation, and cultural industry).  
This debate was related to more general and abstract topics, evoking some very long-
lasting debates within the Left. These topics are: a) critical theory and mass alienation; 
b) the relationship between popular culture and cultural industry; c) the problem, for 
the left, to reach people through popular messages and, at the same time, distancing 
them from mainstream pop culture, thus being simultaneously inside and outside dom-
inant codes; d) the relationship between cultural populism (to talk and act like common 
people do) and alternative cultures, and consequently, the relationship between politi-
cal-electoral effectiveness and the transformation of society; e) reformism (Coldplay) vs. 
radicalism (Springsteen); f) the relationship between alternative cultures and social con-
flicts; g) the role of Gramscian “organic intellectuals”; h) the relationship between high 
culture and popular culture; i) the relationship between popular culture and hegemony; 
l) essentialism vs. constructivism; m) the ability in current times, by a left-wing party, to 
build and spread a systematic cultural discourse, able to expand a collective identity and 
a global vision of society. The whole debate was hence about broad and structural topics 
regarding the very role of the party in society. 
In 2016, Podemos devoted a panel of its Summer University to discuss the dichotomy 
launched by Iglesias and Nega.6 In that panel, Nega discussed with Germán Cano, a phi-
losopher and an active member of Podemos who, since the beginning, had been close 
to the minority’s leader Iñigo Errejón and to his strategic approach. In a few weeks, Nega 
became the most emblematic figure in this debate and Pablo Iglesias, to a certain extent, 
delegated him to argue the majority’s stances. -. In such context he better specified the 
content of his polarizing tweet. He argued that by counterpoising Coldplay and Spring-
steen he meant to talk about two different possible natures of Podemos. While “The 
Boss” is an inter-generational artist, appreciated by people aged from 15 to 70, Coldplay 
are mainly supported by young people. Secondly, the metaphor also regards the dichot-
omy virtuality vs. reality: according to Nega, Coldplay have an enormous success in the 
digital dimension and on social media, while Springsteen “also lives in the real life of the 
 
5 Available at: https://twitter.com/nega_maiz/status/774171491269087232 
6 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r8bOX3Hum5s 
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people.” It is not just a matter of contents and messages, but also of the social usage 
people make of music, the context in which it is played and diffused, and the social prac-
tices it is linked to. Music, in this light, is also seen as a set of social relationships and 
activities, and the people’s reception and use of it is as important as its contents and 
messages. Following this metaphor, Nega described two possible evolutions and natures 
of Podemos: the mainstream-young-virtual-moderate one (the Coldplay-Podemos) vs. 
the popular-intergenerational-social-radical one. These two Podemos closely resemble 
the “Errejonist” and the “Pablista” parties, in the kind of depiction the Pablistas gave of 
their two respective approaches.  
Eventually, Nega stood for a farther musical model, which according to him would be 
even better than Springsteen: according to him, Podemos should be like Rage against 
the machine, a rap metal band that had great success in the Nineties. The discourse in 
this case moved on the terrain of the ways in which an alternative political force must 
search for hegemony and consent: by modifying the forms and content of its messages, 
or by remaining consistent with its original nature and goals? Nega’s opinion was that 
Rage against the machine were the perfect example of the ability to reach and retain a 
great audience without reducing one’s own radicalism. This band, in Nega’s view, was 
the example of a sort of “hegemony by virtue of radicalism (that is by virtue of being 
different, original, and anti-conformist)” counter posed to searching for “hegemony de-
spite radicalism,” which, according to Nega, was Errejón’s approach.  
These stances were deepened and systematized in an article that Nega wrote on the 
national newspaper El Español7, which was later quoted in an interview to Pablo Iglesias. 
It is worth to pinpoint the key arguments in this article, which is highly representative of 
the cultural approach through which Iglesias’s area was facing this internal debate: 
 
“How far should we moderate the discourse in order to attract people without becoming 
blurred until we are unrecognizable? To adapt to reality or transform it?” 
 
According to Nega, this was the key question, and for both him and Iglesias, Podemos 
had to remain critic towards mass culture products and cultural industries, working for 
alternative cultural values more than trying to use those products to transmit its mes-
sages.  Music can be a tool in this work: “we must use the aesthetic and hedonistic di-
mension of music to transmit alternative values,” Nega wrote.  
Nega and Iglesias disapproved what they defined as cultural populism, i.e. a set of 
behaviors through which politicians try to look like common people and to share their 
tastes and their aesthetic and expressive forms. Moreover, popular culture is not a 
 
7 https://www.elespanol.com/cultura/20161012/162613738_13.html 
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‘paradise’ which left wing politicians should simply adopt and reproduce. Within working 
class cultures, also racism, authoritarianism, and male chauvinism prosper. To suppose 
that ‘the people’ and popular classes are better than how they really are, according to 
Nega—who was born and grew up in a popular neighborhood in Valencia—is a true form 
of elitism. This kind of elitism is typical of those who talk in the name of the people with-
out knowing and frequenting them, and who consequently suppose that no pedagogical 
work of politicization towards them is needed by political forces aiming to transform 
society. Thus, this form of cultural populism appears to Nega as a form of political mod-
eration and an approval of society for what it currently is.  
Finally—and this is a decisive point in the internal debate—Nega argued that no cul-
tural work by the party can be disconnected from political and social conflicts. Social 
conflicts, the material emergence of contentious forms of expressing concrete social in-
terests, are the only way through which alternative cultures and imaginaries can get the 
space to emerge.  
Pablo Iglesias, in an interview he gave to the online newspaper El Diario,8stated: 
 
Several times the debate within Podemos is a cultural debate, translated into musical ref-
erences and even into dressing styles. The debate on Coldplay and Springsteen can be sim-
plified as a debate between the hard and the soft ones. El Nega is pointing out the funda-
mental key: do we want to bet on an alternative culture or do we adopt a more or less 
progressive mass culture? This regards the dynamics of symbols, the relationships with 
other actors and with historical memory.  
 
According to Iglesias, some parallelism can be drawn between Podemos and Los 
Chikos del Maíz (Nega’s band). Both, in fact, were created and led to success by grassroot 
people involved in political activism. In saying this, Iglesias also defined “the others” in 
the internal debate: 
 
“And where were you, hipsters? You just suffered this, because you did not succeed in being 
hegemonic in nothing. All the political sectors that at the end filled our rows had always 
seen us with fear, because we used to go much further on. This is true also in the case of 
Chikos del Maíz: they were considered politically incorrect, vanguardists, provoking. Change 
emerges in some way from there. Sure, making hip-hop and going on playing for young 
people are not the same thing.” 
 
 
8 “Es peligroso acostumbrarte a vivir en el parlamento,” El Diario, 19-10-2016. 
https://www.eldiario.es/politica/peligroso-acostumbrarte-vivir-Parlamento_0_571143917.html 
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It was a hard attack by Iglesias towards his Errejonist counterpart, and a contemptu-
ous description of it. The hipsters is how he labels them: mainstream, conventional and 
often wealthy people playing the nonconformists, but scared of any real change and in-
capable of taking effective initiatives. The hipsters was (and currently is) a quite wide-
spread label among the “Pablistas” to define the other area of the party. It almost indi-
cates a sort of anthropological divide between the two areas that perceive each other 
also in terms of different social roots, anthropological diversity and even incompatibility.  
In the same days Pablo Iglesias, spreading on Twitter the new video of the song “They 
call it peace” by the band Riot Propaganda (a rock-hip hop militant band that includes 
the members of Chikos del Maíz), whose music and lyrics resemble the style of Rage 
against the machine, wrote:  
 
They will insult them, they will accuse them, but here they are again, Riot Propaganda, say-
ing what almost nobody dares to say. 
 
In this way, Iglesias established a parallelism between Riot Propaganda and the kind 
of party he wanted: a party able to “say what almost nobody dares to say,” i.e. “the 
truth,” and above all the truth about power, as Iglesias has been stating several times in 
this and further periods (for example during the whole national electoral campaign in 
April 2019, that Podemos strongly centered on this topic). The opposition he established 
between rock and pop music in the musical field was the same he instituted between 
“the street” and “the Palace” in the political one. According to him, during its first year 
in Parliament, Podemos risked becoming too much identified with the institutions and 
their habits and privileges, while it should have gone back to “the street,” closer to the 
concrete daily life and problems of common people. Musically, in Iglesias’s and Nega’s 
approach, rock and Springsteen stand for “the street,” while pop and Coldplay for “the 
Palace.”9  
This is how the Pablista component approached these issues. Which was the approach 
of the Errejonist component? With regard to the metaphorical divide Coldplay/Spring-
steen, they: a) argued that this metaphor was not politically useful and effective; b) mu-
sic and lyrics do not matter per se, but for the way in which they are (or they are not) 
‘re-signified’: every kind of music can theoretically have emancipatory effects; c) to as-
sociate Podemos with ‘the hard against the soft’ was not useful for the party and, on the 
contrary, it was counter-productive.  
 
9 Ibidem 
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In an article that he wrote for the online newspaper “El Confidencial,”10 Eduardo 
Maura, at that time a Podemos’s officer very close to Errejón responsible for the party’s 
cultural politics in Parliament, itemized the arguments of his area on this debate. The 
key point, according to Maura, was to criticize what he considered Iglesias’ and Nega’s 
central argument: 
 
Nega has responded with an approach—supposedly inspired by Adorno's critical theory—
according to which there is a radical outside of alienation that we must think, protect and 
activate. Only from this outside of oppression - which very few know - would it be possible 
to raise awareness in the majority, through truths that translate critical postulates into ac-
tion. 
 
This outside, according to errejonistas, does not exist. Everyone—according to a Fou-
cauldian approach, we could say—is involved in power and in its truth; power is visible 
and ubiquitous, hence there is no need of a ‘prophetical’ party revealing hidden truths. 
In such a cultural world in which everything and everyone is irremediably ‘inside,’ all 
cultural objects can be signified, re-signified or contested only from the inside. No mes-
sage coming from a supposedly existing, non-alienated and pure outside can be politi-
cally effective. People can understand only the languages, codes and symbols in which 
they are involved daily, and the model of an ‘external (revolutionary) consciousness’ 
making people free of its alienation is definitively outmoded.  
By virtue of these arguments, errejonistas such as Rita Maestre stated that their model 
was nor Coldplay neither the Boss, but Beyoncé who, despite being completely main-
stream, was able to convey feminist messages to large audiences. This is an example of 
what the errejonistas mean by “re-signifying the mainstream”: using pop culture as a 
vector for emancipatory messages and claims. Consistently, in his article Maura affirms 
that: 1) Springsteen and Coldplay, to stay in Iglesias’s and Nega’s metaphor, are less dif-
ferent than they seem; they are not non-communicating worlds, as many people are fan 
of both, and both support similar political positions; 2) the political effectiveness of a 
cultural product has nothing to do with the personal commitment of the artist. It is per-
fectly possible that the work of a committed artist is not transformative, and vice versa.  
 
10 “¿Cuestión de gustos? Apuntes sobre el debate cultural entre radicales y moderados,” 22-10-2016. 
  https://blogs.elconfidencial.com/cultura/tribuna/2016-10-22/debate-cultural-radicales-moderados-
podemos_1278248/ 
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This second point is Maura’s and the errejonistas’ key argument. It is very consistent 
with their general cultural and political approach, as well as with the early Podemos’s 
one. This argument regards the opposition between essentialism and constructivism: 
 
All the voices of this conversation defend constructivist positions in politics, and therefore they 
assume that political, cultural, institutional and religious responses are not mere superstructural 
reflections, but parts of an open process not determined in advance by the economic position 
that people occupy in society. But from the same positions [Iglesias’s and Nega’s], culture tends 
to be conceived in the opposite way, in such a way that they end up defending the existence of 
essentially popular cultural manifestations—in the sense of “distinctive of the people,” of “those 
below,” etc.—and of expressions of the “popular classes” with a non-popular, inauthentic and 
non-typical origin. With this, what had been gained politically is lost on the side of culture. No 
cultural manifestation is essential and definitely transformative, popular, elitist or reactionary. 
 
By virtue of this argument, errejonistas completely refused the dichotomies launched 
by pablistas, such as Beyoncé vs. Los Chikos del Maíz, trap vs. combative rap, Coldplay 
vs. Springsteen, and Nirvana vs. Ismael Serrano.11 According to them, the political effects 
of a song or a single verse by Beyoncé or by a trap band can be much more significant 
than the ones by clearly connoted artists such as Serrano or Los Chikos del Maíz.  
Moreover, Maura refused the very opposition hard vs. soft music (and politics). First, 
because in a constructivist perspective, what is ‘hard’ and what is ‘soft’ is never com-
pletely determined. On the contrary, hardness or softness of cultural and political styles 
and strategies depend on the context, the ways in which they are recognized, and the 
function they may play in certain situations. The same song or artist can be ‘hard’ in a 
specific context and ‘soft’ in a different one: 
 
The most committed culture can play a conformist function and, vice versa, from the most 
unexpected places cultural articulations that can change things can arise. Whether an object or 
cultural process is one or the other depends on political factors of at least two types: 1) Inward, 
what do we do with it? There are advanced cultural products experienced in regressive condi-
tions, and left-wing anthems that only generate conformity. 2) Outward, what kind and what level 
of conflict does it generate and are we able to generate with it? 
 
Therefore, according to this area, the key factor for a left-wing party is not to establish 
permanent and unmovable cultural hierarchies, but to be able to move effectively in 
constantly blurry environments, forcing adversaries and potential allies to move 
 
11 Ismael Serrano (1974) is a songwriter and guitarist from Spain, popular in Spain and Latin America, 
known for lyrics that are often political 
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consequently. “The key for Podemos doesn’t lie in sounding more or less hardcore, but 
in the fact that nothing and no one around it can stop moving,” Maura affirmed. 
 
3.3. A soundtrack for political change?  
 
The second dimension in which the relationship between music and politics was 
discussed in Podemos is the one regarding the links between the party, i.e. its public 
activities and its identity, and music. The issue was articulated in this way in two public 
conferences organized by Podemos in 2016 on this topic: May a soundtrack of political 
change exist? Both conferences were previous to the internal conflict between Iglesias 
and Errejón and show that the topic of the relationship between Podemos and music 
has always troubled the party leaders.  Both were titled “Podemos y la música. ¿Hay una 
banda sonora del cambio?”. The first was held in February 2015 and the speakers were 
Diego Manrique (musical journalist), Sonia Cuevas (musical producer), Garikoitz Gamarra 
(musician and member of the club “Podemos cultura”), and Eduardo Maura.12 The 
second one 
was held in July 2015 and the speakers were the songwriter Nacho Vegas, El Nega, 
Victor Lenore (musical critic), and Lucia Lijtmaer (musical journalist).  
In these two conferences, the topics of the relationship between Podemos and music 
and the possible soundtrack of political change were related to wider issues. In particu-
lar: a) the relationship between cultural change and political change; b) the possibility 
for a party, in current times, to have a uniform cultural identity and to be able to transmit 
that identity to militants and voters. A first, concrete field of discussion regarded the 
music that Podemos should feature in its public meetings and campaign events. This was 
considered a central issue regarding the kind of identity the party wanted to transmit to 
its members and to the external environment.  
In its first year Podemos’s events were closed with four songs: People have the power 
by Patti Smith, Golpe Maestro by Vetusta Morla (a 2014 song); Como hacer crack by Na-
cho Vegas (2011); and L’Estaca by Luis Jack (1968). The selected singers and songs well 
represent the internal approaches (and uncertainty) to the different ways in which music 
could communicate identity-forming symbols. As a matter of fact, they included an in-
ternational star and a historically symbolic protest song (Patti Smith and People have the 
power); a current famous Spanish pop-band such as Vetusta Morla, and their song lack-
ing explicit political messages; a politically committed Spanish songwriter such as Nacho 
Vegas (who supports Podemos); and a traditional militant Catalan song such as L’Estaca. 
 
12 Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cCS_ba3njfM. 
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Among these four songs, the most played in 2014 and early 2015 was the one by Vetusta 
Morla, a band that the errejonistas defined as “hipster.” They admitted that this choice 
was a failure: people did not participate in singing it in public events and it did not com-
municate any specific identity. Anyway, the choice to use this song more than the other 
ones was due to the logic of searching for some musical source of identification that 
could sound ‘transversal’ more than traditionally militant. The speakers of the first con-
ference joked mentioning that L’Estaca was included because, as nobody of the partici-
pants in Podemos meetings used to sing the other three songs (which were respectively 
in English and Castillan) and this created a bad effect, the fact that L’Estaca was in Cata-
lan at least avoided any problem of this kind (almost nobody outside Catalunya could 
sing it).  
In January 2015 Podemos organized the “March for change,” a massive political 
demonstration that had a crucial importance for the party. During the demonstration, a 
playlist was selected by the (mainly errejonistas) organizers and transmitted in the 
streets. It was very discontinuous with the music accompanying traditional left-wing 
marches. It included: Spanish bombs by The Clash, My generation by The Who, Déjame 
vivir con alegria by Vainica Doble, Rebel Rebel by David Bowie, Take a Walk on the Wild 
Side by Lou Reed, Raffaella Carrà’s Hay que venir al Sur and Ghostbusters. A very heter-
ogeneous playlist, aiming at representing the transversal profile that the party intended 
to transmit also at the political level. However, at the end of the march and after the 
leaders’ speeches, a band played on the stage the classic Mercedes Sousa’s Todo cambia, 
a song with clear political traditions and implications. This heterogeneity demonstrates 
the high uncertainty troubling the party with respect to its identification with music and 
to the political use that you can make of it. The playlist and the live show chosen for the 
demonstration— like the songs chosen to end public events in its first year—contained 
everything: classic rock, punk, pop-rock, pop and commercial songs, and political songs.  
Despite this heterogeneity, in the first phase of the party trajectory (2014-2015) the 
attempt to be not identified with the “old left” prevailed and, consequently, pop, pop-
rock and mainstream songs prevailed in public events. It is important to notice that the 
cultural sector of the party’s activities (and thus also musical choices) was in that period 
leaded by the errejonist area. In the first national elections in which Podemos partici-
pated, in December 2015, campaign events were opened with the theme song of the 
movie Ghostbusters, and closed with the new party anthem especially composed for the 
campaign. The lyrics of the song, which is still the party anthem, consist of just one sen-
tence: “Sì se puede” (“It is possible”), inspired by one of the most popular slogans by the 
Indignados movements that became Podemos’s main catchphrase. Its sound is pop, 
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simple and emotional.13 At the time of that campaign, also very commercial songs were 
played during events, like one by the Latin pop star Enrique Iglesias.14  
In the following years, there was a clear evolution in the political use of music by Po-
demos. The prevalence of mainstream pop music was replaced, from 2016 and even 
more from 2017, by the prevalence of songs belonging to two political traditions: the 
left-wing tradition (such as Inti-Illimani’s El Pueblo unido jamás será vencido), and the 
republican and anti-Francoist Spanish tradition. From the general elections in 2016 (after 
the alliance with Izquierda Unida), campaign events were often closed with El Pueblo 
Unido… and A galopar. The latter is a 1969 song by Paco Ibañez, and its lyrics are drawn 
from Rafael Alberti’s poem Galope written during the Spanish Civil War and dedicated 
to anti-Francoist militants and soldiers. Therefore, from 2016 on, Podemos overcame 
the idea to be not identified with leftist traditions, and this became visible in its musical 
choices. 
This final choice was, anyway, a proof of the truthfulness of previous concerns and 
doubts among party leaders about the political use of music. What emerges most from 
the public debates that Podemos organized on this topic in 2015 and 2016, is their com-
plaint for the absence of contemporary Spanish bands and songs that could symbolically 
represent the stance of both Podemos and the political change, and thus the lacking of 
musical sources that could create forms of collective identification especially in new gen-
erations.   
In the first conference devoted to the topic “May a soundtrack of political change ex-
ist?”, Eduardo Maura stressed that during the first campaign for European elections in 
2014 and the following months, the discussion about the songs with which to conclude 
public events was very intense in the party. The result was the medley of tradition and 
innovation, militant and pop songs, old and new tunes, international and national music 
that we have observed. According to all the speakers in the two conferences, it was not 
possible to identify one music of change: “Our generation has not its music,” the speak-
ers affirmed. For this reason, the quest for an identity-forming music finally brought the 
party, after 2016, to search the past (El pueblo unido..., A galopar, Todo cambia).  
The answer to the question “is there a soundtrack of political change?” was unani-
mously “no.” The conclusion that came out from these discussions was that, in current 
times, it is not possible to impose “a music of the party” to people. This conclusion was 
linked to the empirical observation that identy-forming music, songs or bands had not 
emerged even after a period of mass social mobilization (the Indignados). This empirical 
 
13 Here it is possible to observe how Gosthbusters was being played at the beginning and the anthem at 
the end of the last campaign event in 2015: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PAd0v0ZFYZ0 
14 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kIOb_7dDYac.  
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observation was connected to a wider assumption, mainly defended by errejonistas: in 
postmodern societies, there is no way to impose or spread uniform cultural messages, 
styles or tastes, because postmodern societies are too various, heterogeneous and frag-
mented. The party cannot produce or diffuse one culture. It can only represent the vari-
ety and heterogeneity spontaneously emerging from society, of course selecting within 
it what can be useful to the party’s political and cultural scopes. The soundtrack of 
change can therefore only be plural and composite, and it can only be composed by “the 
people,” not by the party. As it has been already disclosed, this argument was mainly 
defended by the errejonist area, which dominated the cultural sector of the party activ-
ities until 2016. It was also due to their internal weakening and their subsequent exit 
from the party that from 2016 on Podemos started politicizing more (and making more 
traditional) its “soundtrack”: in today’s Podemos it would not be possible to hear Raffa-
ella Carrà in a public meeting. The ‘music of the party’ followed the party trajectory: from 
populism and search for a transversal consent, to a more left-wing and antagonist profile 
where leftist traditions were rediscovered. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The origins of Podemos can be connected to four fundamental elements. The aca-
demic origin of the founders and their attempt to popularize the academic and political 
debate. The foundation of a web TV and the consequential acquisition of a national no-
toriety by Pablo Iglesias. The capacity of the Indignados movements to reshape political 
identities and achieve a majoritarian consent. Laclau’s theory on populism. Issues such 
as common sense, populism, hegemony, the relationship between politics and popular 
cultures, communication and consent, were at the core of all these four elements. Po-
demos was ‘pop’ since its beginning. To try to be hegemonic, to match common sense, 
popular attitudes and identities and to go beyond the traditional boundaries in which 
the alternative left was enclosed—in one word, to cease being marginal and try to be-
come majoritarian—was crucial since the activities of La Promotora and Contrapoder, in 
the experience of La Tuerka, as well as in the founders’ interpretation of the Indignados 
movements and of Laclau’s theory on populism. In a way, Podemos itself was launched 
as a “pop product,” a ‘political commodity’ that had to break into mainstream politics 
and be able to compete with the ‘majors’ of the sector, going beyond niche markets. 
Thus, its relationship with pop cultures is constitutive and primary.  
We observed the centrality of all these elements in the internal debates on music and 
politics. First, in the discussions the leaders had about the ways in which music had to 
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be used in public events. On this terrain, we observed the internal tension to represent 
social heterogeneity, to use music that could communicate with wide audiences, and to 
transmit through music that the party shared the masses’ tastes and did not talk from 
an ‘outside’ of popular attitudes. At the same time, we have seen that this attempt sig-
nificantly failed. The “music of the party” was contradictory, it included extremely diver-
sified musical tendencies, styles, traditions and contents, and it did not succeed (as the 
same leaders who were responsible for these choices admitted) in communicating and 
sharing a clear identity. The ‘old left’ and ‘pop culture’ constantly overlapped within the 
“soundtrack of change,” signaling the same uncertainty and ambiguity that lay in the 
party on the political side. At the end, the political evolution of the party determined a 
choice between these two musical constellations. When the party moved away from its 
initial and self-defined populism, to a certain extent the attempt to be popular and 
‘mainstream’ left space to the shared identities and traditions that political history made 
available.  
What emerges from the internal debate on this issue is the disorientation of party 
leaders because of the absence of generationally and socially shared musical tastes and 
landmarks, even within the social groups that were involved in the Indignados protest 
cycle. This absence made the work of the party on this field even more complicated and 
signaled wider problems regarding the relationship with mainstream cultures and pop-
ular identities as a whole, as well as the difficulties in creating new identities and cul-
tures. Even more, in the conferences organized on this issue, the main conclusion by 
party leaders (and by the experts discussing with them) was that, in our current complex 
society, it is impossible for a political party to carry out such a work.  
Those problems were also at the core of the internal (political) debate based on mu-
sical metaphors. In that context, political divisions were translated into cultural and mu-
sical oppositions, and into the two traditional sides: ‘apocalyptic’ and ‘integrated’. The 
resurgence of this sharp and paradigmatic dichotomy signals that within a party based 
on a populist theory such debates may assume a particularly high relevance and over-
heated discussions, but they concern very long lasting - and even initial - dilemmas in the 
history of left-wing parties. These dilemmas pivot on the question if and how it is possi-
ble to transform society acting in a largely hostile environment, if and how it is possible 
to combine radicalism and effectiveness, consistency and consent, and to pursue social 
change avoiding marginality.  
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